"제1장 작전의 기초" 3/6 미 육군 부대의 도전 : CHALLENGES FOR ARMY FORCES

미 육군 부대의 도전 : CHALLENGES FOR ARMY FORCES

우리는 다른 나라를 정복하거나 강제하기 위해 강력한 군사력을 유지하고 있는 것이 아니다. 우리 군대의 목적은 단순 명쾌하다. , 전쟁을 미연에 막고 싶다.
                                                                                           로널드 레이건 대통령

1-15. 통합부대는 대부분의 적대자가 미국과의 직접적인 군사 충돌을 통해 전략목표를 달성하려고 하는 것을 억제한다. 그래서 타인을 타겟팅 악의적인 활동과 무력분쟁을 통해 간접적으로 목표를 추구하게 된다. 경제 행위, 대리인 부대 (프록시 forces)의 지원, 가짜정보(disinformation)의 유포 등이 있다. 적인 불측 사태나 대규모 전투 작전에 항상 대비해 둘 필요가 있다.


CHALLENGES FOR ARMY FORCES
We don’t maintain a strong military force to conquer or coerce others. The purpose of our military is simple and straightforward: We want to prevent war by deterring others from the aggression that causes war.
President Ronald Reagan
1- 15. The joint force deters most adversaries from seeking to achieve strategic objectives through direct military confrontation with the United States. As a result, adversaries pursue their objectives indirectly through malign activities and armed conflict targeting others in ways calculated to avoid war with the United States. These activities include subversive political and legal strategies, establishing physical presence on the ground to buttress resource claims, coercive economic practices, supporting proxy forces, and spreading disinformation. However, several adversaries have both the ability and the will to conduct armed conflict with the United States under certain conditions, which requires Army forces to be prepared at all times for limited contingencies and large-scale combat operations.
The notion of integrated deterrence goes beyond preventing armed conflict. It includes preventing adversaries from increasing the scope and intensity of their malign activities conducted below the threshold of armed conflict

1- 16. Global and regional adversaries apply all instruments of national power to challenge U.S. interests and the joint force. Militarily, they have extended the battlefield by employing network-enabled sensors and long-range fires to deny access during conflict and challenge friendly forces’ freedom of action during competition. These standoff approaches seek to—
•Counter U.S. space, air, and naval advantages to make the introduction of land forces difficult and exploit the overall joint force’s mutual dependencies.
•Increase the cost to the joint force and its partners in the event of armed conflict.
•Hold the joint force at risk both in the U.S. and at its overseas bases and contest Army forces’ deployment from home station to forward tactical assembly areas overseas.
1- 17. Adversaries increase risk to the U.S. joint force in order to raise the threshold at which the United States might respond to a provocation with military force. By diluting the joint force’s conventional deterrence, adversaries believe they have greater freedom of action to conduct malign activities both within and outside the U.S. homeland. Adversaries exploit this freedom of action through offensive cyberspace operations, disinformation, influence operations, and the aggressive positioning of ground, air, and naval forces to support territorial claims. Adversaries employ different types of forces and capabilities to attack private and government organizations, threaten critical economic infrastructure, and disrupt political processes, often with a degree of plausible deniability that reduces the likelihood of a friendly military response. Conducting these activities in support of policy goals threatens allied cohesion, weakens responses, and creates additional opportunities. (See paragraphs 2-40 through 2-44 for description of enemy information warfare.)
1-18. Threat standoff approaches intensify other friendly challenges. These challenges include—
•Gaining and maintaining support of allies and partners.
•Maintaining the continuous information collection needed to determine composition, disposition, strength, and activities of enemy forces.
•Integrating and synchronizing intelligence at all echelons, distributed across large operational areas with diverse requirements.
•Preparing forward-stationed forces to fight and win while outnumbered and isolated.
•Protecting forward-positioned forces and those moving into a theater.
•Minimizing vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction.
•Maintain C2 and sustainment of units distributed across vast distances in noncontiguous areas and outside supporting ranges and distances.
•Maintaining a desirable tempo while defeating fixed and bypassed enemy forces.
•Defeating threat information and irregular warfare attacks against the United States and strategic lines of communications.
1- 19. Army forces prepare to conduct operations in contested theaters prior to and during armed conflict, including in the United States. Army forces must account for being under constant observation and the threat’s ability to gain and maintain contact in all domains, wherever they are located. Army forces must be ready to deploy on short notice to austere locations and be capable of immediately conducting combat operations. During the initial phases of an operation, Army units may find themselves facing superior threats in terms of both numbers and capabilities. The first deploying units require the capability to defend themselves and continuously collect information on threat activities, as they provide reaction time and freedom of maneuver for follow-on forces. Army units with limited joint support may have to defend while at risk from enemy long-range fires. Forward-stationed forces may defend critical terrain with other coalition forces to delay enemy offensive operations. Some forward-stationed forces may defend joint bases to mitigate the impact of enemy attacks against strategic and operational lines of communications. In both cases, forward-stationed Army forces must be prepared to fight while relatively isolated in the early stages of an enemy attack.
1-20. The likelihood of the enemy force’s use of massed long-ange fires and weapons of mass destruction increases during large-scale combat operations—particularly against command and control (C2) and sustainment nodes, assembly areas, and critical infrastructure. To survive and operate against massed long- range fires and in contaminated environments, commanders ensure as much dispersion as tactically prudent. Army forces seek every possible advantage using dispersion, deception, counterreconnaissance, terrain, cover, concealment, masking, and other procedures to avoid detection and mitigate the impact of enemy fires. In the offense, Army forces maneuver quickly along multiple axes, concentrating only to the degree required to mass effects, and then dispersing to avoid becoming lucrative targets for weapons of mass destruction and enemy conventional fires. Although dispersion disrupts enemy targeting efforts, it increases the difficulty of both C2 and sustainment for friendly forces. Success demands agile units that are able to adjust dispositions rapidly, assume risk, and exploit opportunities when they are available.
1-21. The high tempo of large-cale combat operations creates gaps and seams, generating both opportunities and risks as enemy formations disintegrate, disperse, or displace. After generating sufficient combat power for offensive operations, friendly forces may intermingle with or fix and bypass enemy formations. This requires follow-on and supporting units to protect themselves and to defeat enemy remnants in detail within the rear area as part of consolidating gains.
1- 22. Army forces deploying from the United States and elsewhere face a wide range of threats that are difficult to counter without joint support. The disruptive effects of enemy action may occur at unit home stations, ports of embarkation, while in transit to the theater, and upon arrival at ports of debarkation. Army forces may not have the capability, or the authority, to preempt these attacks, although counterintelligence may aid in early identification of threats. The threat’s ability to contest the deployment of forces may degrade combat power available to forward forces and cause unit personnel and equipment to arrive in piecemeal fashion at ports of debarkation. (See Appendix C for more information on deployments contested by threat forces.)